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ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY AND CARTER
UNDER SEC RULE 2(e): THE POWERS
THAT BE AND THE FEAR OF THE
FLOCK
by William Kenneth C. Di9pel
All of these [regulatory] measures, of course, merely check or control
rather than cure a fundamental condition which underlies the whole
problem. That condition has been reflected by the amazing absence
of social consciousness on the part of directors and business executives
and by their lack of any awareness of the implications and results of
many practices which flourished in recent years. It has not been so
much a matter of depravity and of evil intent as the consequence of
cutting as close to the mythical legal line as possible. This lack of
social mindedness has not been wholly or largely that of business. It
has been equally shared by lawyers.'
N February 1981 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is-
sued a prospective ruling defining what it considered to be unprofes-
sional and unethical conduct for which the Commission can discipline
and suspend the practicing attorney from appearance before the SEC.2
The ruling opened a floodgate of criticism and comment, primarily be-
cause of the ruling's prospectivity and its apparently broad scope.3 The
SEC ruled that an attorney engages in improper professional conduct
when, in the discharge of significant responsibilities as to corporate com-
pliance with security disclosure requirements, he becomes aware of non-
compliance and fails to take prompt steps to terminate the
noncompliance. 4 The SEC subsequently requested comment on the ruling
in order to refine its regulation of security attorney ethical conduct.
1. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1328-29 (1934).
Similar theories were argued virtually simultaneously in Mr. Justice Stone's famous address
delivered at the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle dedication. Stone, The Public
Influence ofthe Bar, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1934).
2. In re Carter, [1981] 593 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) N-I [hereinafter cited as
Carter].
3. Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
4. Carter, supra note 2, at N-I, N-19.
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The ruling sparked controversy over both the SEC's power to promul-
gate ethical conduct regulations and the manner in which this ruling pro-
posed to discipline under the preexisting authority of SEC Rule 2(e).5 This
Comment examines the history and application of SEC Rule 2(e), the
Commission's power to adopt its own standards of ethical conduct, and the
effects of recent Commission decisions concerning attorney responsibility
under SEC Rule 2(e). This Comment then proposes clarifications to the
prospective ruling of In re Carter, a decision that supports SEC authority,
vis-d-vis the authority of state bar associations, to regulate attorney con-
duct and liability in the area of securities law disclosure. This Comment
concludes that attorneys practicing in the securities area, a predominantly
nonadversarial arena, should be held to a higher standard of ethical con-
duct than attorneys engaging in other practices of the law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEC RULE 2(e) AND THE POWERS THAT BE
Congress has never expressly delegated to the SEC the power to regulate
the attorneys who practice before it.6 Nevertheless, this regulatory power
has consistently been held as inherent in the Commission's rulemaking au-
thority.7 As such, an examination of the history, purpose, and operation of
rule 2(e) should serve as a guide in interpreting the ultimate scope of its
application. The discussion that follows, however, does not purport to be
an exhaustive treatment of the historical development of rule 2(e); it
merely presents an overview of those occurrences that may be critical
when examining attorney liability before the SEC.
A. The History
Rules of Practice adopted by the Commission were originally promul-
gated pursuant to section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.8 Rule 2(e) of
the Rules of Practice set specific requirements for admitting attorneys to
5. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981).
6. Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.D.C. 1957), a/'don other grounds, 251
F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (SEC has power to discipline attorneys under promulgation of
rule 2(e)); 36 Fed. Reg. 8933 (1971); 35 Fed. Reg. 15,440 (1970) (attorney disciplinary power
granted to Commission by implication); see also Johnson, The Dynamics of SEC Rule 2(e):
.4 Crisis for the Bar, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 629, 630.
7. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 373 (1973); Goldsmith v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 122 (1926); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570,
579-80 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securi-
ties Lawyers- An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974); Myers, The 4ttorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Profes-
sionalResponsibility" SuggestedAttorney Liabilidyfor Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1976); Shipman, The Need
for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Secur-
ities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973); Note, The Duties and Obligations of the Securities
Lawyer: The Beginning of a New Standardfor the Legal Profession?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 121;
Note, Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student Marketing Corp.: The Attor-
ney's Duty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 153 (1972).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act grants the Commission the
power "to make, amend and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this title . I..." ld § 7 7s(a) (1976).
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practice before the Commission and provided the SEC with the authority
to suspend or disbar any person who did not possess the requisite qualifi-
cation or character for that practice. 9 Rule 2(e) has been equated with the
formation of an "SEC bar."' 0 Rule 2(e) was amended in 1938 to remove
the mandatory requirement that an attorney could not practice before the
Commission without first filing an application with the SEC.Il Neverthe-
less, the Commission maintained the power to discipline and deny practice
to any person appearing before it.1
2
Rule 2(e) was altered for a second time in 1970 to provide for suspension
from appearance or practice before the SEC by a person who: (1) does not
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or (2) lacks in integ-
rity or character or who has engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct; or (3) has willfully aided and abetted the violation of a federal
securities law or who has willfully violated such a law.13 While the Com-
mission has argued that attorney suspension is automatic upon a Commis-
sion finding of liability,' 4 a close reading of rule 2(e) provisions indicates
the authority to suspend is discretionary in nature. 15 The SEC's deliberate
expansion of attorney liability16 and simultaneous reduction of the admin-
9. September 1935 was the effective date of the rule. Subsequent revisions of rule 2(e)
have also been justified as inherent in § 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which empow-
ers the Commission "to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to implement the provisions of this title .... . 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976). The "necessary
or appropriate" language of § 23(a), a much less stringent standard than the "necessary"
language of § 19(a), clearly provides the Commission with a greater degree of rulemaking
flexibility.
10. Carter, supra note 2, at N-2.
11. Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938).
12. The 1938 amendment also terminated the SEC practice of maintaining a register of
those persons admitted to practice under the original rule. Subsequent to the 1938 restric-
tions, rule 2(e) provided that:
(e) The Commission may disqualify, and deny, temporarily or permanently,
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who
is found by the Commission after hearing in the matter
(1) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(2) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical
or improper professional conduct.
Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938). Although the 1938 amendment stream-
lined the Commission's power over its regulatory duties, the authority to discipline attorneys
practicing before it was left substantially intact.
13. Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)
(1981). The third category of potential suspension, providing for suspension for "willful"
violation or "willful" aiding and abetting, appears to be redundant, because such activity
would be covered in the "unethical or improper professional conduct" provision of the 1938
amendments. Id
14. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3.
15. The suspension and disbarment preface to the type of conduct for which an attorney
may be disciplined states "Itihe Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the
privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter ....... 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e) (1981) (emphasis added). Use of the conditional term "may," as well as extensive
alternatives as to specific types of discipline ("temporarily or permanently," for example),
clearly indicates discretionary equitable powers, as do rule 2(e) provisions that provide the
SEC with an extensive array of reinstatement procedures subsequent to disciplinary action.
See id.
16. See Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970).
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istrative requirements for admission to SEC practice' 7 illustrates the policy
position of the Commission that regulation of practicing securities attor-
neys is of the utmost importance.
B. The Purpose
The SEC has stated unequivocally that the driving force behind the cre-
ation and enforcement of rule 2(e) is the necessity of "protect[ing] the in-
tegrity of [the Commission's] processes."' 18  Asserting that rule 2(e)
represents a balancing of interests,' 9 the Commission has narrowed the
focus of its purpose to that of professional misconduct. This purpose is to
establish protective measures required to shield both the SEC and the in-
vesting public.20 Implicit within the Commission's rationale is the twofold
theory that: (1) practice before the SEC is a privilege, not a right; 2' and
(2) a predominate portion of a securities lawyer's work is not adversarial in
nature.22 Judge Friendly's oft-quoted statement that "the lawyer's opinion
can be [an] instrumen[t] for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the
chisel or the crowbar" 23 recognizes the disease the SEC is trying to cure.
While emphasizing that impropriety by a securities attorney creates dam-
aging implications extending beyond the particular transactions in-
volved,24 the Commission nevertheless maintains that such a potential
effect does not necessarily impose "duties to the public on lawyers where
17. See Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938).
18. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3; see Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d
Cir. 1979).
19. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3.
20. Id
21. Id. Rule 2(e) explicitly states that "[tihe Commission may deny, temporarily or per-
manently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it .... ." 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)
(1981) (emphasis added). See Johnson, supra note 6, at 629. The idea of the "privilege" vis-
A-vis the "right" to appear before the SEC apparently stems from the pre-1938 power of the
Commission to regulate admissions of practicing attorneys before it. As that authority has
now been eradicated, a serious question arises as to whether practice before the Commission
varies from practice in any other legal arena, at least in regard to the distinction of privilege
and right.
22. "[T]he task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the
bar's shoulders . . . . Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character. He
doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and alet [sic] judges
check him." In re Emanuel Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), afd without opinion, 495
F.2d 1075 (D.D.C. 1974); see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973).
For criticism of the Commission's position, see Cooney, The Registration Process.- The Role
of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1333-37 (1978); Sonde, The Responsibility of
Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. i,
8-15 (1973). Assuming the invalidity of the Commission's "privilege" argument, the ques-
tion concerning the degree of adversarial content within the securities area may ultimately
be dispositive of the need for SEC regulations beyond state bar canons of professional con-
duct. If the securities lawyer is an advocate, the Commission should not have the privilege
of control beyond that of other judicial branches over similarly situated advocates. See infra
Section IV for a discussion of this privilege/right issue.
23. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964). The court affirmed the conviction of a lawyer for conspiracy to fraudulently sell
unregistered securities. Id
24. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3. "[W]rongdoing by a lawyer or an accountant raises the
spectre of a replication of that conduct with other clients." Id
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such duties would not otherwise exist."' 25 The issue of whether rule 2(e)
enlarges the duties of the securities attorney beyond the duties of others in
the legal community, particularly litigators, must, however, be viewed in
the historical context of the operation of the rule.
C The Operation
Although rule 2(e) was adopted shortly after formation of the SEC in
1933, the Commission did not officially pursue potential violators until
1950.26 In In re Fleishmann27 the SEC suspended a practicing attorney
from appearing before the Commission due to improper professional con-
duct in the preparation and filing of false declarations on behalf of a stock-
holder's committee. 28 Noting that the attorney was actually engaged in a
ploy to defraud the Commission,29 the SEC nevertheless failed to articu-
late a definition of "unethical and improper professional conduct." 30 The
use of rule 2(e) following Fleishmann quickly began to increase, however,
and between 1950 and 1959 four additional rule 2(e) proceedings against
attorneys were recorded. 31 The Commission initiated eleven more pro-
ceedings during the following decade. 32 In the following five-year period
of 1969-1974, eleven more attorneys were suspended from appearing
before the SEC, while another was censured for federal securities viola-
tions.33 Multiplication of rule 2(e) proceedings continues, with over sev-
25. Id. at N-4. While the Commission maintains the position that the securities law-
yer's responsibilities as to the public are not enlarged, the question still remains whether
regulations such as rule 2(e) impose a higher duty upon the securities lawyer as to his own
client. The latter issue is the more important, at least to the securities attorney who seeks
guidance.
26. Little comment has been made concerning why the Commission did not pursue rule
2(e) violations until 15 years following the rule's promulgation.
27. 37 S.E.C. 832 (1950).
28. Id. at 836.
29. Id
30. Id. Subsection (1)(ii) of rule 2(e) is the most frequently relied upon provision of the
rule, providing for suspension of an attorney solely for engaging in "unethical or improper
professional conduct."
31. These proceedings are compiled at Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Fed-
eral Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 969, 983 n.64, 984 n.66.
32. Id; see also Johnson, supra note 6, at 632.
33. See, e.g., In re Gribben, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5532 (Oct. 8, 1974), 5
SEC Docket 243 (attorney permanently suspended from SEC practice); In re Ferguson, Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974), 5 SEC Docket 37 (willful aiding
and abetting under § 17(a) of Securities Act and § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act; attorney
censured); In re Clammer, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5518 (Aug. 2, 1974), 4 SEC
Docket 656 (attorney "voluntarily" resigned from practice before SEC to avoid permanent
suspension); In re Lee, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5462 (Feb. 27, 1974), 3 SEC
Docket 600 (permanent suspension because of federal district court finding of antifraud pro-
vision violation); In re Mariscal, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5442 (Nov. 30, 1973),
3 SEC Docket 101 (permanent suspension because of federal district court finding of securi-
ties act violations); In re Fields, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), 2
SEC Docket I (permanent suspension because of "serious infractions of securities laws" and
attorney's failure to explain his conduct); see also In re Blair, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9666 (July 10, 1972); In re Ezrine, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5268 (June
29, 1972); In re Blonquist, SEC Litigation Release No. 5377 (May 25, 1972); In re Germaise,
1982]
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enty suits initiated against attorneys since 1974.34 A cursory inspection of
the number of alleged violations demonstrates an obvious attempt by the
SEC to police improper conduct by members of its own bar.3 5
Accentuating the increasing number of alleged rule 2(e) violations is the
SEC's institution of minimal requirements of proof in a disciplinary action
against the unethical attorney. While the Commission has consistently as-
serted that not every violation of the law will be sufficient to invoke the
plenary sanctions of rule 2(e), 36 the SEC has nevertheless implemented
relaxed rules of evidence and correspondingly low burdens of proof in an
attempt to secure suspensions of those attorneys whose improper conduct
is adjudged of the magnitude to activate rule 2(e). 37 Indeed, early com-
mentators have argued that past decisions allow indefinite suspension
based solely upon circumstantial testimony. 38
The SEC has justified its use of a low burden of proof through two theo-
ries. Initially, the most severe sanction the Commission can impose upon
the attorney is suspension from securities practice, not total disbarment
from the practice of law.39 While this argument superficially supports a
lesser burden of proof, it nevertheless ignores the practical result of the
suspension of an attorney from the securities area of the law. Such a deci-
sion would have a damaging effect upon an attorney's overall practice and
reputation.40 Once an attorney has been suspended from the SEC bar, he
may no longer benefit from the securities practice of his firm. 4' Addition-
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7, 1971); In re Kivitz, 44 S.E.C. 600 (1971), rev'd,
475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Kauffman, 44 S.E.C. 374 (1970).
34. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
15982 (July 2, 1979), 17 S.E.C. Docket 1149 (dissenting opinion) [hereinafter cited as Keat-
ing]; see also Dockery, Attorney Liability Under SEC Rule 2(e)." A New Standard?, 11 TEx.
TECH L. REV. 83, 84 nn.14 & 15 (1979).
35. SEC prosecution of unethical conduct continues. In December 1981 a senior part-
ner in a California law firm, pursuant to a rule 2(e) proceeding, agreed to a nine-month
suspension from practice before the SEC. News & Comment, [1981] 634 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) A-2. The rule 2(e) proceeding alleged violation of the 1933 Securities Act regis-
tration and antifraud provisions. The SEC claimed the attorney advised that the removal of
restrictive legends from pledged securities, for the purpose of hypothecation, would not con-
stitute a distribution requiring registration. Id. Without admitting or denying the rule 2(e)
charges and findings, the attorney accepted the recommended suspension. Id
36. Carter, supra note 2, at N-4. "The violation must be of a character that threatens
the integrity of the Commission's processes in the way that the activities of unqualified or
unethical professionals do." Id
37. See, e.g., In re Kivitz, 44 S.E.C. 600, 611 (1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(involving rule 2(e)(1) proceeding). But see infra note 50.
38. Orrick, Organization, Procedures and Practices of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1959); Timbers & Garfinkle, Examination of the Com-
mission's Adjudicatory Process- Some Suggestions, 45 VA. L. REV. 817 (1959).
39. In re Kivitz, 44 S.E.C. 600, 611 (1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40. Johnson, supra note 6, at 635.
41. The SEC has determined that the partners of an attorney who has been suspended
from securities practice pursuant to rule 2(e) are not allowed to permit the suspended practi-
tioner to: (1) take part in SEC securities matters; (2) create the appearance to third parties
that he is entitled to practice before the Commission; or (3) receive profits from the firm
based upon a proportion of the firm's securities work. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5147
(May 10, 1971). Some question still remains as to whether the partners of the suspended
attorney have an affirmative duty to prevent these listed activities or are to be held to a lesser
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ally, rule 2(e) has been construed to be of such broad scope that a firm as
an entity, vis-A-vis the individual attorney, may be suspended under the
standards of rule 2(e). 42 The suspension of a firm would thus prohibit
"[p]artners and associates of a disqualified firm [from practicing] before
the Commission so long as they remain members or are associated with the
firm."'43 Thus the Commission's argument that suspension merely from
the securities area is only a piecemeal prevention of the practice of law
refuses to acknowledge that such disciplinary action may have the practi-
cal effect of total disbarment.
The Commission's second argument in support of a lesser burden of
proof under rule 2(e) stems from the long-revered SEC belief that an attor-
ney's ability to practice in the securities area before the Commission is a
privilege rather than a right.44 As such, no constitutional safeguards are
attached to the revocation of a granted privilege. 45 This theory rests on the
presumption, however, that the Commission has correctly determined that
practice before it is a privilege.46 A finding that practice before the SEC is
instead a right inherent in the general privilege47 of practicing law negates
such a theory and weakens the lesser burden of proof rationale. Indeed,
one circuit court has stated that practice before the Commission is to be
viewed as a right,48 but that this classification does not require a more
restrictive burden of proof.49 Nevertheless, the majority of circuit courts
have either failed to address this issue uniformly in SEC disciplinary ap-
peals or are not cognizant of its importance.50
standard of good faith. Some question also remains whether the SEC can suspend or even
discipline partners of the suspended attorney without some higher burden of proof than that
required in usual rule 2(e) proceedings. Indeed, an action against partners of a suspended
attorney is once-removed from the initial primary violation, and the SEC should perhaps,
without evidence of scienter, be held to a higher burden of proof than that required to sus-
pend the attorney.
42. Id.
43. Id at 3.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1975); see In re Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, 371 (1960).
45. Johnson, supra note 6, at 632 n.12.
46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47. Because one must meet certain licensing prerequisites before being allowed to prac-
tice law in state or federal court, the ability to practice law generally can be viewed as a
"privilege." See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 305a-c (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1982);
see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court characterized a law-
yer's ability to appear before the SEC as "an attorney's license to practice as a 'right' which
can not lightly or capriciously be taken from him." Id (citation omitted).
49. Id
50. While the Kivitz case is often cited as an attempt by the SEC to declare explicitly a
lesser prosecutorial burden of proof for rule 2(e) violations, the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the SEC finding of Kivitz's liability for the improper securing of a registration
statement. Id. at 962. In reversing the Commission's final decision, the court made several
attempts to clarify the application of rule 2(e). Although ignoring the differences in stan-
dards of proof that might be applied in the distinction between a right and a privilege, the
court reversed the Commission due to its failure to base the suspension of the licensed attor-
ney upon "substantial evidence." Id. at 962. This finding is commensurate with the general
rule that administrative proceedings are conclusive upon review if supported by the substan-
tial evidence standard. 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976); see, e.g., Hugh v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974
(D.C. Cir. 1949). Moreover, the court emphasized that considerable weight should be given
1982]
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Questions concerning the burden of proof standard imposed by the SEC
in rule 2(e) proceedings have multiplied since the Commission's initial ar-
ticulations of the lower threshold of proof of improper conduct. 5' Intensi-
to the professional reputation of the alleged violator. Id. at 961. "[A] man's reputation may
be sufficient, by itself, to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Id This statement uses
descriptive language similar to the burden of proof standard inherent in criminal proceed-
ings, implying a higher prosecutorial burden of proof in rule 2(e) proceedings. fd at 962. In
isolation, Kipitz thus purports to establish a normative burden of proof that the SEC must
meet in order to be victorious in a 2(e) disciplinary proceeding. But see infra notes 51, 52 &
168 and accompanying text.
51. In re Kauffman, 44 S.E.C. 374 (1970). Paralleling the SEC's attempt to broaden
attorney responsibility through a relaxation of the standard of proof required for suspension
has been the apparent expansion of liability of the attorney for violation of federal securities
laws while acting in a professional capacity, such as corporation board member or director.
See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where two attor-
neys, one an officer of the corporation and the other a director, were held liable for failure to
reasonably investigate statements on a registration form signed by both men. Id. at 698.
The standard of reasonableness used in determining liability, not unlike that of general tort
law, is defined by the 1933 Act as the amount of care expected of a prudent man in the
management of his own property. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976). The attorneys in BarChris
were found liable in their professional capacity not for mispreparation of the registration
statements, but merely for authorizing their release by signature. 283 F. Supp. at 698. The
text of the opinion does not address the issue of whether such a negligence-based standard
might also be applied in the situation where the registration statement itself is prepared by
outside counsel. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (liability of attorney in
professional capacity with actual knowledge of misrepresentations); cf. Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (attorney's good faith may not free him from
liability); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(definition of materiality of violation expanded to whether reasonable man might have acted
otherwise).
Two central questions were also left unanswered by the BarChris court in the wake of
attorneys' fears over the potentially dangerous high standard of conduct: (1) Is the attor-
ney's duty of reasonably independent investigation for truth limited solely to matters involv-
ing registration statements, or does it extend to other less encompassing securities activities;
(2) Is the attorney who discovers potentially improper conduct on the part of his client under
a duty to either the SEC or perhaps even the public to disclose such conduct? Two subse-
quent decisions attempt to resolve these issues. In SEC v. Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1973), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an attorney could be held liable based
upon a standard of negligence. The court reasoned that since the typical investor is usually
in a less than arms-length negotiating posture and thus must rely to a great degree upon the
skills of the attorney, the imposition of a negligence standard is not overly onerous. Id at
541-42. "[T]he smooth functioning of the securities markets will be seriously disturbed if the
public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an opinion on
such matters." Id at 542. Consequently, an attorney who participates in any securities
transaction may be enjoined or suspended from the securities practice for improper profes-
sional conduct, regardless of actual knowledge of the violative transaction.
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973), mandated
that the securities attorney has an affirmative duty to insist that his client disclose new
financial information, or, in the alternative, both withdraw as counsel and notify the SEC of
potential security violations. Id at 290. The thrust of the opinion was to force attorneys to
police their own clients on behalf of the SEC and the public. Id The case involved lob-5
violations, however, and it is uncertain how the application of National Student Marketing
would have affected a 2(e) proceeding, especially in terms of self-policing on behalf of the
SEC. For a review of similar actions filed immediately in the wake of National Student
Marketing, see SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6041
(Aug. 28, 1973) (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 1973) (negligence because lawyers "should have
known"); SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5888 (May 14,
1973) (D.D.C. filed May 11, 1973) (attorneys named in professional capacity rather than as
corporation principals); SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 5724
(Feb. 6, 1973) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 5, 1973) ("should have known" liability base used again);
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fying this difficulty has been the Commission's periodic modification of
rule 2(e) in an attempt to increase regulatory leverage over the attorney.5 2
Confusion as to the SEC's burden of proof combined with the Commis-
sion's increasing attempts to facilitate prosecution methods has resulted in
uncertainty as to the day-to-day operations of the securities lawyer, and
possible impairment of the attorney's ability to represent his client prop-
erly.53 In addition, a hostile situation between the Commission and the
securities bar has resulted.54 This confrontation has led to the question
central to any discussion of SEC regulatory power: Does the Commission
have the authority to promulgate and enforce its own standards of ethical
conduct?
II. SEC AUTHORITY TO ADOPT RULE 2(e): THE REPUTATION OF
POWER IS POWER
Recent rule 2(e) proceedings have confronted the issue of whether the
Commission has the jurisdictional authority to establish what is essentially
a code of ethical conduct for the securities bar.5 5 Four main arguments are
made in attempting to refute SEC control in this area. First, because the
Commission has never been given the express authority to regulate ethical
conduct, the SEC usurps the control of state bars by implying power of
such magnitude.5 6 Second, the Administrative Practices Act (APA) ex-
pressly forbids the de facto establishment of a specialized legal bar;57
see also Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371; Comment, SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corporation. The Extent of Attorney Liability, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
571 (1973); Note, Securities Regulation-Attorneys' Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the
SEC's National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1265 (1972).
52. Prior to Kauffman, subsection (2) of rule 2(e) had not yet been added to provide for
the possibility of an automatic suspension of an attorney convicted of willfully violating
federal securities laws. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. In Kauffman a lawyer
who had been convicted of willful securities violations nevertheless continued to practice
before the Commission for almost a year before the SEC could manipulate the regulatory
machinery to suspend him. Thus, subsection (2) was adopted to provide automatic suspen-
sion for convicted willful violators. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15,440, 15,441 (1970). Likewise, sub-
section (3) was adopted providing for suspension, albeit not automatic, of attorneys who
have been permanently enjoined by a court of proper jurisdiction, for similar violations of
securities laws. The Commission may suspend an attorney-violator "without preliminary
hearing" merely by serving the attorney with proper notice as specified. As such, the SEC
essentially adopts the finding of a "competent" court and is not required to review those
findings in either substance or procedure. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2), (3) (1981).
53. The argument is that restrictive Commission controls over the day-to-day decisions
of the securities attorney will force the attorney to subordinate the needs of his client to the
needs of the SEC and the public, leaving the corporate client to fend for himself. "[T]he
Commission has seized almost absolute power over lawyers . . . . In effect, the license of
counsel to practice before the Commission has come to hang by a thread." Johnson, supra
note 6, at 640.
54. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3 to -4.
55. Id at N-I.
56. Id at N-I to -3.
57. The Administrative Practice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976), provides:
An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest
court of a State may represent a person before an agency on filing with the
agency a written declaration that he is currently qualified as provided by this
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therefore, rule 2(e) violates the APA.58 Third, as a basic policy matter, an
entity exercising prosecutorial discretion over an attorney should not also
be empowered to regulate ethical conduct through disciplinary action, es-
pecially when professional judgments of the attorney are required.59
Fourth, the Commission does not have the wisdom or the expertise to reg-
ulate ethical conduct effectively.60
Conceding that authority to promulgate rule 2(e) and similar regulations
is not expressly granted to the SEC,6 1 the Commission has nevertheless
relied upon legal precedent in support of its authority to effectuate rule
2(e).62 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals most recently confronted this
question. In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC63 the Second Circuit articulated
the Commission's authority in this regard as a "necessary adjunct to the
Commission's power to protect the integrity of its administrative proce-
dures and the public in general."'64 Noting that rule 2(e) was promulgated
in the SEC's attempt to police itself and maintain its own integrity,65 the
court in Touche Ross asserted that rule 2(e) walked the precarious line of
assuring the public of competent securities attorneys while simultaneously
allowing counsel to perform adequately for clients.66 This issue appears
resolved in favor of the SEC.
Attacks that rule 2(e) conflicts with the Administrative Practice Act have
likewise been refuted,67 usually based upon interpretive readings of the
APA's legislative history. 68 Emphasizing APA language that does not at-
tempt to limit the discipline of attorneys who practice or appear before the
Commission,69 the SEC has consistently argued that this neutral language,
read in conjunction with the APA's legislative history, does not preclude
SEC action in rule 2(e) proceedings. 70 Possible procedural due process re-
subsection and is authorized to represent the particular person in whose behalf
he acts.
58. Carter, supra note 2, at N-I to -3.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
62. "No court, having considered the question, has found the Commission not to have
the authority to adopt Rule 2(e)." Carter, supra note 2, at N-2; see SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
63. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
64. Id at 582.
65. Id
66. Id; see also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) (rule
"reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation"); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (rule may be valid as necessary adjunct to protect administra-
tive procedures and public).
67. Carter, supra note 2, at N- I to -3. Section 500(b) is the APA provision usually cited
in this vein. See supra note 57.
68. The Commission argues that APA § 500(b) was intended to abolish admission re-
quirements for practice before the SEC in an attempt to allow clients a choice in securities
attorneys. See H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4170, 4171.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1976) provides that the Act does not "authorize or limit the
discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative capacity
before an agency."
70. See Carter, supra note 2, at N-2. "[T]he supporting legislative history makes clear
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verberations stemming from the requirements of the Administrative Prac-
tice Act, however, have in large part been ignored. 71
The issue of potential abuse when an agency is empowered with both
prosecutorial discretion and disciplinary authority has largely been dis-
missed by the SEC.72 Asserting sensitivity to these potential abuses, 73 the
Commission has nevertheless engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, pitting
protection of the Commission's processes and the public's interests against
potential future abuse.74 The balance has fallen clearly in favor of protec-
tion over potential abuse. 75 Thorough analysis of the abuse question, how-
ever, may not be possible within this balancing approach, at least not
without directly addressing the question of preventive measures that can
be used in anticipation of abuse.76
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the SEC's authority to regulate
ethical conduct surfaces in a confrontation over the Commission's exper-
tise in this area. The SEC has consistently asserted that rule 2(e) applies
only to "securities lawyers performing disclosure-related professional serv-
ices, an area within our responsibility and our expertise."'77 This explana-
tion ignores the fact that despite the presence of substantive securities law,
the SEC engages in both the procedural regulation of ethical conduct and
the substantive area of professional responsibility. Yet, the Commission
has held firm to the position that it is not attempting to supersede recodifi-
cation attempts of various state bar disciplinary bodies. 78 In fact, the SEC
claims to rely upon private sector initiatives as "generally applicable stan-
dards governing lawyers in the discharge of their professional responsibili-
ties," 79 while still exerting its own rigorous standards of application.80
that Congress, by eliminating agency-established admission requirements, did not intend, as
a secondary or collateral purpose, to affect or delimit the existing disciplinary authority of
federal agencies .... Id (footnote omitted).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976) provides that "[elxcept in cases of willfulness or those in
which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension, revo-
cation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the institution of agency proceed-
ings therefor, the licensee has been given both notice in writing of conduct or facts which
constitute the basis for regulatory action, as well as an opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance with all lawful requirements." Id Procedural objections to rule 2(e)
proceedings could be raised as well, particularly in conjunction with subsections (2) and (3).
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
72. See Keating, supra note 34, at 1165.
73. See Carter, supra note 2, at N-2.
74. Keating, supra note 34, at 1165-66.
75. "Rule 2(e) should not be utilized as an enforcement tool against those who violate
the federal securities laws and happen coincidentally also to be lawyers or accountants. But
where such individuals engage in professional misconduct which impairs the integrity of the
Commission's processes, the Commission has an obligation to respond through the applica-
tion of Rule 2(e) [regardless of potential abuses]." Id
76. See J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 81-82, 869-92 (1975).
77. Carter, supra note 2, at N-3.
78. Id
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
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Serious question exists whether this rationale can be consistently applied.8'
In the Code of Professional Responsibility that became effective for
American Bar Association members in 1970, the attorney's duty to his cli-
ent is defined in general terms as a fiduciary duty.8 2 More specifically, the
attorney is required to preserve secrets obtained from the client in a profes-
sional relationship that "the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri-
mental to the client."'8 3 If the SEC view of such liberal holdings as Na-
tional Student Marketing8 4 prevails, requiring the attorney either to resign
or to "blow the whistle" on his nondisclosing client, the lawyer may be
conjunctively subject to: (1) criminal prosecution,85 (2) SEC disciplinary
regulation under rule 2(e),8 6 (3) SEC injunctive action, 7 and (4) a suit for
damages for failure to disclose under the federal securities laws.88 More-
over, disclosure of client confidences in order to avoid any of the above
listed liabilities may require the attorney to breach applicable state bar
ethical rules, thus creating the potential for disciplinary action by the state
bar and a suit for damages by the client.8 9 Advocates of rule 2(e) proceed-
ings, however, argue that all state ethical codes have provisions to recon-
cile these apparent conflicts, thus avoiding a confrontation between the
SEC and the local bar.
The more important question is whether the securities lawyer should be
held to the same standard of conduct as that of other legal advocates,
based upon theories of the noncompetitive nature of the securities prac-
tice.90 The determination of the SEC's expertise to regulate ethical con-
duct of practicing attorneys is not nearly as simplistic as the Commission
would assert,91 especially in light of varying state bar conduct code provi-
sions92 and recent Supreme Court expansion of the attorney-client privi-
81. See generally Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389 (1978).
82. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon
4 [hereinafter cited as ABA CPR].
83. Id DR 4-101. The attorney's duty to keep the confidences of his client is not abso-
lute under the ABA CPR. The duty may be absolute, however, under the scope of the
judicially created attorney-client privilege. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(c) provides that the at-
torney may breach client confidence to defend himself against accusation of wrongful con-
duct or to prevent the commission of a future crime, but not to reveal the commission of a
past crime.
84. See supra note 51.
85. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
86. See supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
87. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
89. See Zeiden v. Oliphant, 33 A.D. 450, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1945).
90. See infra notes 142-87 and accompanying text.
91. See Carter, supra note 2, at N-3.
92. The ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, commonly re-
ferred to as the Kutac Commission, is currently embroiled in controversy over proposed
modifications to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Wall St. J., July 23, 1982,
at 15, col. 4. The controversy has focused upon the need for a revised model code of con-
duct, the inadequacies of the current code, and the possibility that corporate office counsel
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lege in the corporate context.93
Despite assaults on the SEC's authority to assert control over the ethical
conduct of its practitioners, the courts have clearly supported the Commis-
sion 94 and have overruled the general objections made to the SEC's au-
thority.95 Nevertheless, one additional objection to the SEC's regulation
of ethical conduct should be addressed in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision concerning the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context in Upjohn Co. v. United States.96 The Court in Upjohn purported
to extend the privilege not only to those members of the "control group"
such as directors and large shareholders, but also to potentially any mem-
bers of the corporation who communicate with counsel concerning the
"subject matter" of the asserted privileged discussions. While some doubt
exists as to the precedential value of Upjohn in varying factual circum-
stances,97 policy-based expansion of the attorney-client privilege, rather
than restrictions of state bar ethical codes, create the most potential for
conflict in rule 2(e) proceedings. This is because the attorney-client privi-
lege has long been recognized as a stricter, more absolute rule than the
general standards set forth in local ethical guidelines.98 Strict construction
of the privilege, combined with a pervasive judicial tendency to decide
privilege cases on a fact-by-fact basis, 99 reduces the certainty with which
lawyers can predict when certain communications will be deemed confi-
dential and complicates the determination of whether rule 2(e) contradicts
or is superfluous to current law. 10 A resolution of the problem is at best
tentative, at least until the repercussions of Upjohn are calmed by subse-
should perhaps be treated differently than other more adversarial attorneys. Judicial Con-
ference-D.C. Circuit, 89 F.R.D. 169, 234 (1980). Whether the ABA will adopt the Kutac
Commission's proposed modifications to the Model Code, and whether those modifications
may conflict with or moot the Carter standard remains to be seen. Official vote on the
changes has been delayed, once again, until February 1983. Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1982, at 12,
col. 5.
93. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see Note,Attorney-Client Privilege
in the Corporate Context-Upjohn Co. v. United States, 35 Sw. L.J. 935 (1981). For a discus-
sion of the relationship of the attorney-client privilege to the problems presented by rule 2(e)
proceedings, see part IV and notes 147-49 infra and accompanying text.
94. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra note 62.
95. Carter, supra note 2, at N-I to -3.
96. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
97. The entire decision is explicitly premised upon the peculiar Upjohn facts. Id at 396;
see Marriott Corp. v American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497, 277
S.E.2d 785, 792 (1981); Leer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 n.8
(Minn. 1981); Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413 (S.D. Ohio
1981).
98. The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept,
unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source
of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should
endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege . ...
A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privi-
lege and timely to assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client.
ABA CPR, supra note 82, EC 4-4.
99. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394; Note, supra note 93, at 944.
100. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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quent judicial clarification. Meanwhile, the SEC's authority to regulate
ethical conduct continues to be exercised with judicial approval.' 0 ' The
reputation of power is indeed power itself.
III. IN RE CARTER: EXPANSION OF ATTORNEY LIABILITY AND THE
FEAR OF THE FLOCK
One of the most recent and volatile of the SEC's rulings concerning rule
2(e) proceedings occurred in In re Carter. 0 2 The decision is not important
in its result; the attorneys prosecuted were found not to have violated the
standards of rule 2(e) at the time of the alleged improprieties. 0 3 The
Commission issued a prospective ruling, however, that an attorney who is
aware of his client's violations of federal securities disclosure laws may
violate rule 2(e) professional standards unless the attorney takes prompt
steps to terminate the noncompliance." °4 In effect, the SEC defined the
general boundaries of "unethical and improper conduct," thus perpetuat-
ing SEC bar fears of extensive liability for the securities attorney. 105
The Carter opinion focused on the activities of National Telephone
Company, Inc. from late 1974 to mid 1975 and during subsequent Com-
mission proceedings.' 0 6 In early 1978 the SEC instituted injunctive pro-
ceedings against National's directors and auditors, alleging violations of
antifraud provisions due to their failure to disclose the company's worsen-
ing financial condition in a timely manner.107 The SEC simultaneously
filed suit against acting counsel for National under the authority vested in
rule 2(e). 10 8 The two attorneys who allegedly engaged in improper con-
duct were William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr.10 9 An adminis-
101. See Carter, supra note 2, at N-I to -3.
102. Carter, supra note 2.
103. Id at N-17. "Our review of the record, which includes respondents' [Carter's and
Johnson's] periodic exhortations to [their client] to improve the quality of National's disclo-
sure, leads us to believe that respondents did not intend to assist the violations by their
inaction or silence. Rather, they seemed to be at a loss for how to deal with a difficult
client." Id "[N]o finding of unethical or unprofessional conduct would be appropriate."
Id at N-19.
104. Id The Commission, in attempting to achieve fairness to the defendants, delineated
the ruling prospective in application from the date of the opinion, Feb. 28, 1981. Id
105. Id
106. National was founded in 1971. The company was formed to lease sophisticated
telephone systems to corporate customers based upon long-term leases of five to ten years.
Consequently, as is commonly true with companies that lease extensive amounts of expen-
sive equipment, the greater proportion of overhead costs in connection with new leases (in-
cluding equipment, installation, and marketing expenses) is incurred prior to the
commencement of rental payments. As rental payments were the only significant source of
revenues for the young company, National's cash flow situation slowly worsened with each
new lease, necessitating external financing of operations to sustain continued growth. Id at
N-14.
107. [1978] 436 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-16. The SEC stated that National's direc-
tors had failed to fulfill their "affirmative duty to assure that the marketplace is provided
accurate and full disclosure concerning the basic viability of the company and the continuity
of its operations." In re Carter, [1978] 439 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6.
108. In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (Mar. 7,
1979).
109. Carter and Johnson had been retained by National in 1974 to assist in sophisticated
[Vol. 36
COMMENTS
trative law judge found that Carter and Johnson willfully violated and
aided and abetted violations of sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.110 The violations stemmed not from the affirmative
acts of the attorneys in violating disclosure requirements, but rather from
their failure to act in light of the corporation's failure to disclose."'l The
thrust of the administrative opinion was that the two attorneys could be
held liable not only for directly violating securities laws by their affirma-
tive actions, but also for indirectly failing to adhere to SEC guidelines
through an inability to force corporate disclosure. 1 2 Pursuant to rule 2(e),
Carter and Johnson were suspended from practice before the SEC for peri-
ods of one year and nine months respectively."
3
Reaction from the bar was immediate, as securities lawyers attacked the
decision as overbroad and oppressive."l 4 Displeasure with the ruling
stemmed in large part from the ambiguity of the standards articulated in
the opinion and from fear that a finding of liability without the require-
ment of scienter would lead to indiscriminate SEC policing of security
lawyers.' 15
financing efforts in order to keep the financially troubled company afloat. The attorneys'
allegedly violative conduct largely centered around National's securing of a $21 million
bank loan. The loan contract provided that, if the company failed to maintain a specified
cash liquidity, National had to "terminate all sales activities, dismiss all sales personnel, and
limit its operations to those necessary to service existing leases." [1978] 436 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) A-2. Two months after finalization of the loan, National had failed to maintain
the specified cash liquidity required in the loan agreement. As a result, Carter and Johnson
advised corporate management to commence the curtailment plan specified in the original
loan contract and effect public disclosure of the company's financial situation. Management
ignored the advice, and both Carter and Johnson continued in their previous capacities as
legal counsel. Id
110. In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175, at 82,168
n.5.
I ll. Inaction was thus the evil. Overtones of liability based upon Carter and Johnson's
preparation of certain documents were also evident. Id at 82,168-69. The administrative
aw judge specifically found that: (1) Carter had revised a December 1974 press release that
was false and misleading in that it failed to explain adequately the nature of promised scale-
down operations of the company; (2) neither attorney took action to correct a misleading
letter sent to National shareholders by the president and controlling shareholder of Na-
tional; (3) National's January 1975 8-K form was false and misleading in failing to disclose
adequately certain requirements of the loan agreement; (4) Carter and Johnson failed to
insure adequate disclosure through the board of directors in lieu of National's president and
controlling stockholder; and (5) Carter and Johnson failed to inform the board of directors
of National management's unwillingness to heed legal advice concerning required disclo-
sure. Id. at 82,168-87.
112. Id. at 82,168, 82,187.
113. Id at 82,187.
114. Dockery, supra note 34, at 90.
115. The SEC has long taken the position that scienter need not be shown in rule 2(e)
proceedings. See In Re Haskins & Sells, Accounting Series Release No. 73 (1952), 5 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,092. Whether the Carter decision requiring no scienter for rule
2(e) violations will affect rule lOb-5 requirements of scienter remains to be seen. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion; negli-
gence sufficient for lOb-5 violation); but see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978)
(2d Circuit theory rejected; scienter required to establish rule lob-5 violation). While SEC
authority under rule 2(e) to discipline without scienter has never been successfully chal-
lenged, commentators allege such lax standards of conduct no longer protect the attorney
from discipline for good-faith judgmental errors. Dockery, supra note 34, at 93.
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In reviewing the administrative law judge's suspensions of Carter and
Johnson, the Commission distinguished between liability based upon pri-
mary violations of securities laws, and aiding and abetting." 6 The Com-
mission summarily ruled that neither attorney primarily violated securities
laws and was thus not subject to liability under rule 1Ob-5.11 7 The focus of
the review, therefore, was the possibility that the attorneys aided and abet-
ted National's violations, thus subjecting them to the disciplinary measures
of rule 2(e).18
Whether an attorney has aided and abetted primary violations, as de-
fined by Carter, is determined through proof of three elements: (1) an
independent violation by another (here National); (2) "knowing and sub-
stantial assistance" of conduct that constitutes the violation; and (3) aware-
ness by the aider and abettor that his actions constitute part of an improper
activity." 9 The SEC found the first element, a securities law violation by
another, with "no difficulty."' 20 The second element, substantial assist-
ance, was found in that such assistance is inherent in the factual context of
a securities lawyer performing his professional duties. 12' The securities
lawyer, by the very nature of his position, works intimately with the client
such that substantial assistance can almost be assumed.' 22
The critical element in Carter and in future application of rule 2(e) is the
third element of aiding and abetting, intent. In Carter the SEC held that a
finding of aiding and abetting "requires a showing that respondents
[Carter and Johnson] were aware or knew that their role was part of an
activity that was improper or illegal."123 The evidence in Carter was thus
held insufficient to establish this third crucial element of intent;' 24 at the
very least, an element of recklessness must be found. 25 The SEC noted,
however, that the standards for determining intent must vary depending
116. Carter, supra note 2, at N-14; see 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(l)(iii) (1975).
117. Carter, supra note 2, at N-14.
118. Id
119. Id at N-15. These three elements are a codification of various circuit court deci-
sions and represent, in the eyes of the SEC, prevailing law. See, e.g., Investors Research
Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); lIT v. Corn-
field, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1978); see also cases cited in Carter, supra note 2, at N-15 n.57.
120. Carter, supra note 2, at N-14, N-15.
121. Id at N-15.
122. Id In this regard, the Commission did not distinguish between an attorney's profes-
sional advice given orally or in writing vis-A-vis similar advice transmitted through the
drafting of SEC-required documents. "Liability in these circumstances should not turn on
such artificial distinctions, particularly in light of the almost limitless range of forms which
legal advice may take." Id The SEC was trying to circumvent the possibility of an attor-
ney's masking liability by avoiding the formality of participation in the required SEC draft-
ing process.
123. Id The SEC emphasized that intent is the distinguishing factor between those pro-
fessionals who should be considered as subjects for professional discipline and those attor-
neys who have merely made good faith judgmental errors or who have simply been careless.
Id
124. Id
125. Id The requirement of recklessness smacks of a standard lower than that of negli-
gence. Similar definitional and semantical problems exist, however, with both terms.
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upon whether a direct misrepresentation or an indirect omission is in-
volved.' 26 If a misrepresentation is involved, mere awareness or reckless-
ness will suffice to establish the requirement of intent. 27 Conversely, if an
omission is found, intent cannot be established unless there is "conscious
intent" on the part of the attorney to violate securities laws or a specific
duty to disclose accompanied with some undefined degree of scienter.128
Carter and Johnson were subsequently found not to have had the degree
of intent necessary to establish liability, and the administrative law judge's
suspensions were accordingly reversed. 29
The Commission continued beyond the immediate question of the
Carter factual context, however, into the area of prospective ethical and
professional responsibilities.1 30 Recognizing that a practical definition of
unethical or improper professional conduct had yet to be established, mak-
ing it virtually impossible for attorneys to predict what is and what is not
acceptable attorney activity, the SEC attempted in Carter to define these
terms: 131
The Commission is of the view that a lawyer engages in "unethical or
improper professional conduct" under the following circumstances:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a
company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substan-
tial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his
continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes
prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance. 132
While the lawyer is not obliged under rule 2(e) to attempt to rectify
every disclosure violation regardless of its effect upon the public, Carter
nevertheless holds the lawyer to a professional duty to determine when
"prompt steps" must be taken to circumvent noncompliance. 33 The Com-
126. Id at N-16.
127. Kerbs v. Fall River Ind., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Strong v. France,
474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp.
682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978).
128. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); see also cases cited in
Carter, supra note 2, at N-16 n.64. "When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an
aider and abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the high 'conscious intent' variety
can be proved. When some special duty of disclosure exists, then liability should be possible
with a lesser degree of scienter." 522 F.2d at 97. In this regard, an implied connection
between rule lOb-5 violations and disciplinary proceedings brought pursuant to SEC rule
2(e) exists. The Commission may intend that rule 2(e), not necessarily requiring the classic
element of scienter, supplement rule lOb-5, which requires scienter. The result is that re-
gardless of the existence of attorney intent to violate the federal securities laws, attorney
liability via the securities laws becomes a very real possibility. See supra note 115.
129. Carter, supra note 2, at N-17, N-20.
130. Id at N-17 to -19.
131. Although the decision purports to define these terms absolutely, the Commission
nevertheless stated that it "intends to issue a release soliciting comment from the public as to
whether this interpretation should be expanded or modified." Id at N- 17. Carter thus does
not speak conclusively upon the definitions of proper and improper rule 2(e) conduct. See
SEC Request for Comment on Standards of Conduct for Professionals, [1981] 621 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) G-1.
132. Carter, supra note 2, at N-19.
133. Id
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mission explains that at least initially, "counselling accurate disclosure is
sufficient"'134 action by the attorney to avoid rule 2(e) liability. 35
But there comes a point at which a reasonable lawyer must conclude
that his advice is not being followed, or even sought in good faith, and
that his client is involved in a continuing course of violating the secur-
ities laws. . . . The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next
step. 136
The Commission enumerated potential, specific "next steps" as: (1) enlist-
ment of aid from other members of the firm's management; (2) a direct
approach to the board of directors or any individuals therein; (3) resigna-
tion by the attorney; or (4) "prompt action that leads to the conclusion that
the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem
... 137 The Commission is quick to emphasize that resignation in the
face of client noncompliance is not the only permissible course of ac-
tion, 138 although it is a practical means of forcing disclosure in certain
circumstances. 139 In fact, the Carter opinion encourages a continuation of
the attorney-client relationship, even in light of continued and open non-
compliance, in the hope that the continued relationship will result in an
opportunity for termination of the disclosure violations. 140 "So long as a
lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting reasonable efforts to prevent
violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations have been
met." 141
IV. ESTABLISHING A TRUER STANDARD OF RULE 2(e) LIABILITY:
CARTER REVISED
The Carter standard of rule 2(e) liability is an important step in helping
the securities lawyer to predict what constitutes ethical conduct under SEC
regulations. As such, it represents a departure from the normative judicial
procedure of deciding concrete cases based upon particular factual circum-
stances and refusing to promulgate broad-based guidelines for future con-




137. Id (footnote omitted).
138. "Premature resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client relation-
ship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the securities laws." Id Resignation
of the attorney also raises other considerations, including foreseeable prejudice to the client.
See ABA CPR, supra note 82, DR 2-110; ABA CPR, supra note 82, EC 2-32, -33.
139. The Commission concluded that if the misconduct of the client is so extreme or the
involvement of the client's board of directors so pervasive in unethically avoiding disclosure
requirements, then the responsible attorney's only alternative is resignation. The SEC antic-
ipated such circumstances to be rare. Carter, supra note 2, at N- 19.
140. Id
141. Id The SEC noted that in those cases in which resignation is not the only alterna-
tive available to the practicing attorney, the ultimate success of the lawyer in obtaining com-
pliance by his client is not to be considered in rule 2(e) proceedings. Instead of a result-
oriented standard, the test in this regard is means oriented. A valuation of means as op-




can predict with more certainty the consequences of their actions. Ini-
tially, because this is an area laced with moral and ethical values, equitable
notions of fairness come into play. The Commission cannot be expected to
formulate an all-encompassing rule, which evaluates with utopian preci-
sion every situation that could arise dealing with ethical matters in the
securities area. Nevertheless, the SEC is obligated to both the securities
bar and the public to establish a practical, yet flexible, standard of conduct
for the practicing attorney. This standard must be exact enough for the
attorney to plan his conduct with confidence, and the standard must be
flexible enough to compensate for any potential factual situation. As such,
the Carter standard of ethical conduct 42 is inadequate.
Definitional problems are immediately apparent with the Carter stan-
dard. Viewed in a practical setting, the semantic questions inherent in the
standard raise more issues than the standard resolves. Focal connotative
problems include the phrases:
(1) "significant responsibilities": If a lawyer must be engaged in
significant responsibilities to fall under rule 2(e), are those du-
ties to be defined in terms of quality or quantity? This prob-
lem is especially acute when more than one attorney for a
specific firm acts as counsel for the corporation. Are all attor-
neys to be viewed together or individually to determine what
constitutes significant responsibilities?
(2) "aware": The Commission requires that the attorney be aware
of disclosure violations. While the Carter opinion purports to
define this term in regard to whether direct (misrepresenta-
tion) or indirect (omission) violations occur, the phrase "rea-
sonable" is also used repeatedly in reference to the duties of
the attorney. Use of the adjective reasonable to define aware
implies a higher negligence standard as opposed to the dual
direct/indirect standard discussed earlier.143 Is such a compli-
cated standard required?
(3) "client": Definitional difficulties are always raised when an at-
torney represents a corporate client; 144 while the client is the
corporate entity, not the individual directors, the entity itself is
personified only through individuals. Thus, the issue of the
client's identity must always be confronted, especially in light
of the SEC's suggestion that the attorney enlist help from indi-
vidual directors in order to encourage the client-entity to dis-
close. Is such contact with technically a third person, the
individual director, permissible under the attorney-client
privilege?
(4) "substantial and continuing": The failure of the client to dis-
close must likewise be substantial and continuing. How great
142. See supra text accompanying note 132.
143. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
144. See Carter, supra note 2, at N-18.
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must the failure to disclose be to be considered substantial?
How continuous must the failures be to establish continuing
failure under this aspect of the standard?
(5) "prompt steps": Prompt steps to end client noncompliance are
required of the attorney to avoid rule 2(e) liability. How
prompt is prompt, and to what end must the attorney go in
order to satisfy this broadly stated duty?
Of special concern is the open-ended final requirement of "prompt steps"
and its potential violation of the attorney-client privilege. This privilege
violation might very well occur if an attorney were ever required under the
good faith and reasonable efforts standards of Carter to disclose his client's
securities violations to a third party. The Commission did, however, ac-
knowledge this potential conflict in the final paragraphs of Carter:
This case does not involve, nor do we here deal with, the additional
question of when a lawyer, aware of his client's intention to commit
fraud or an illegal act, has a professional duty to disclose that fact
either publicly or to an affected third party. Our interpretation today
does not require such action at any point, although other existing
standards of professional conduct might be so interpreted. 45
While the SEC purports not to require the attorney to disclose his client's
violative conduct to a third party, the Commission has framed the issue in
terms of the "client's intention to commit fraud or an illegal act.' 46 This
framing of the issue does not address the difficulties that the attorney may
face if his client has already engaged in the unethical conduct. In this
regard the Commission is silent. Under the Carter standard, a direct con-
flict might indeed arise between "prompt steps to end the client's noncom-
pliance"' 47 involving communication of the problem to a third party and
the attorney-client privilege when either: (1) the client has no intention to
violate Commission standards but nevertheless violates them; or (2) the
client has already violated SEC standards. Such a conflict is probable in
light of the Upjohn decision.' 48 Unless decisions subsequent to Carter pro-
vide clarification, the securities attorney might very well be placed in a
position of choosing between his client and his career. 149
In light of the above ambiguities, the Carter rule 2(e) standard should be
revised. The emphasis should be shifted from a masked standard of negli-
gence to a more straightforward approach that focuses upon the burdens of
production and proof. This revised standard would provide a simple test
of conduct, yet one sufficiently flexible to cope with more complex situa-
tions. Initially, the SEC's phraseology concerning "awareness" of the at-
145. d. at N-19 n.78.
146. Id
147. Id at N-19.
148. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
149. The Commission has yet to officially revise the Carter standard. But see the per-
sonal remarks of General Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission, intimating
the SEC may soon begin to chip away at the foundation of the Carter standard. SEC Gen-




torney and "prompt steps" to force compliance should be obviated.
Instead, the Commission should adopt a normative tort standard of negli-
gence' 50 against which to measure the liability of an attorney for unethical
or unprofessional conduct under rule 2(e). That is, the securities attorney
should be held simply to the duty of a reasonably prudent securities attor-
ney in the same or similar circumstances.
One scholar has argued that Carter is nothing more than a paraphrasing
of the typical negligence standard as it applies to securities.' 5' This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact that the SEC articulated a dual standard to
establish intent as an element of aiding and abetting. 52 In the context of
omissions rather than direct misrepresentations, "intent" as an element of
aiding and abetting is not established without a conscious intent on the
part of the attorney to violate the securities laws. 153 This undefined ele-
ment of scienter clearly falls outside of the realm of the classic negligence
standard.' 54 Therefore, at least as to attorney omissions of action under
rule 2(e) aiding and abetting provisions, 155 scienter of some sort is required
and the negligence standard is inapplicable.
Even if the Carter decision could be read to endorse an across-the-board
negligence standard for rule 2(e) proceedings, the phraseology of Carter,
as well as its complex prospective structure, detracts from and unduly bur-
dens what should be a very straightforward standard of conduct. This
Comment has previously noted that the Carter opinion introduces new ter-
minology into the realm of rule 2(e) proceedings. 156 Instead of attempting
to mask what is essentially a negligence standard through the use of varied
terms preceded by the adjective "reasonable," the SEC should declare that
the classic tort negligence standard will now apply to attorneys in rule 2(e)
disciplinary proceedings. This approach to difficult ethical problems will
simplify application of the expected standard of counsel conduct and will
not require voluminous attempts at defining and redefining superfluous
Commission explanations of the straightforward tort negligence standard.
Thus, the dual Carter standard of omission by the attorney (requiring
some element of scienter) versus misrepresentation (using a strict negli-
gence standard) is transformed from a substantive distinction to a proce-
dural distinction. Omission by the attorney falls within a negligence
150. "Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent ... person
would use under similar circumstances .... The prevailing view is that there are no 'de-
grees' of care in negligence, as a matter of law; there are only different amounts of care as a
matter of fact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930-31 (5th ed. 1979). Consequently, a securi-
ties attorney is held to such care as a reasonably prudent and careful securities attorney
would use under similar circumstances.
151. See Dockery, supra note 34, at 95.
152. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
153. Carter, supra note 2, at N-16.
154. If any element of scienter or even recklessness (as opposed to negligence) is re-
quired, the "known or should have known" language of the typical negligence standard is
necessarily diluted to "known." Hence, the standard is no longer one of negligence; the duty
becomes a lesser one. See supra note 125.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(iii) (1975).
156. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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standard with the initial rebuttable presumption that the attorney has
acted properly, while misrepresentation by the attorney is included in the
same negligence standard with the inverse rebuttable presumption that, via
negligence per se,157 the attorney has acted improperly. This latter struc-
ture simplifies the Carter standard; only one substantive test must be ab-
sorbed by the attorney. Since the practicing attorney will look to the
substance of ethics for guidance in a difficult practical setting, as opposed
to the procedure of disciplinary hearings, a single substantive ethical stan-
dard is preferable.
A tort-based standard of conduct has several advantages over the stan-
dard espoused in Carter. First, the negligence standard is simple to apply.
It does not purport to codify ethical conduct standards masked in terms of
reasonableness, historically the focal point of tort-based liability. It advo-
cates instead a simple yet flexible standard of application without intro-
ducing new terminology and the consequential need for clarification
therein. Second, the negligence standard has historically proven a worka-
ble doctrine. It can be used in the most easy and most complex of circum-
stances. Furthermore, it is not foreign to basic fiduciary principles of
corporate law.15 8 Third, the rich history of tort-based negligence can pro-
vide guidelines for the application of negligence standards to rule 2(e) pro-
ceedings. Fourth, the negligence standard for unethical conduct under
rule 2(e)(1)(iii) blends well with other portions of rule 2(e). For example,
direct violations of securities laws by the attorney himself can be couched
in terms of negligence per se, thereby maintaining consistency within the
rule and the corresponding standard of conduct. Fifth, the Carter stan-
dard focuses upon the various alternatives the attorney has when faced
with a client who refuses to comply with disclosure laws. This standard
thus concerns what the attorney should have done. A negligence standard,
conversely, focuses upon what actually was done and whether the conduct
engaged in was reasonable; hence, the focus is retrospective, not hypotheti-
cal. This is clearly the perspective a disciplinary proceeding should take.
Sixth, the Carter standard lists a series of attorney alternatives to client
nondisclosure. Presumably, this list is exhaustive. A negligence standard,
conversely, would allow the attorney the flexibility of any conceivable al-
ternative to nondisclosure, so long as that alternative is reasonable. In this
respect, a negligence standard of ethical conduct is much less restricting to
157. In the case of rule 2(e) violations, specifically attorney misrepresentations, negli-
gence per se would be established by violation of the state ethical codes or by violation of
federal and state securities laws. See, e.g., ABA CPR, supra note 82, EC 1-5, 7-26; ABA
CPR, supra note 82, DR 1-102(3), (4), 7-102(A)(3)-(8). Assuming the SEC initiates the rule
2(e) proceeding, it is represeoting the class intended to be protected by state bar codes and
securities laws, the public, against the foreseeable risk of unethical attorney conduct.
158. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). In attempting to
define "materiality" under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act in false and misleading proxy
statements, the Court adopted specific "conventional tort tests" of materiality. Id at 444.
Materiality was thus defined as whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the
fact omitted or misrepresented. 1d; cf. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973)
(pre-Hochfelder decision explicitly adopting negligence standard under rule 2(e), calling that
standard not overly strict).
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the practicing attorney than is the more mechanical Carter decision. Most
important, however, is the fact that use of the negligence standard in lieu
of the dual Carter standard of omission versus misrepresentation should
be mandated for the securities lawyer due to the nature of the securities
practice. Because of the nonadversarial relationship of the securities law-
yer to his client and the potential for reverberations throughout society for
any impropriety by the SEC bar, securities lawyers should be held to a
higher standard of care than awareness or knowledge of disclosure viola-
tions. Instead, the negligence standard is the test by which the securities
lawyer should be measured.
The proposed negligence standard could be criticized as placing too
great a burden upon the SEC bar, especially in view of the complexities of
current securities law. This criticism can be mitigated, however, through
the concepts of rebuttable presumption and cost-benefit analysis. Initially,
the proposed negligence-based standard of rule 2(e) liability is predicated
upon the theory of a rebuttable presumption that the attorney acted in an
ethical and professional manner. The theory would apply in the absence
of a negligence per se situation. The presumption would pl'ce the burden
of production squarely upon the shoulders of the SEC to establish impro-
priety by the attorney. A mere showing of some evidence by the SEC of
violative conduct by an attorney would not be enough to defeat this pre-
sumption. An affirmative showing by the SEC of violative conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence would initially be required for the lawyer
to be required to defend himself. This presumption in favor of the attor-
ney would both discourage frivolous complaints by the SEC and protect
the SEC bar from abuse of the negligence-based standard of conduct.
Likewise, an explicit cost-benefit analysis 59 should be instituted to
weigh the respective merits of SEC and public concerns against the alleged
violative conduct of the securities attorney. Judge Learned Hand defined
the cost-benefit analysis in terms of the following:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and bal-
anced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.
All these are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate,
and the second two are generally not so, even theoretically. For this
reason a solution always involves some preference, or choice between
incommensurables .... 16o
Despite Hand's disclaimer of quantifiability, his valuation of factors has
been accepted in terms of an economic cost-benefit analysis. 16 1 If the
product of the likelihood of injury times the seriousness of the potential
159. "[T]he risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude
as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in
which it is done." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
160. Conway v. O'Brien, Il1 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940); see also Judge Hand's opinion
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
161. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUDIES 29 (1972).
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injury exceeds the burden of precautions, then the failure to take those
precautions is negligence.' 62 If the cost of prevention or of curtailment-
whichever cost is lower--exceeds the benefit in damage avoidance to be
gained by incurring that cost, society as a whole would be better off, at
least in economic terms, to forgo damage prevention.' 63 While there are
conflicting views as to whether traditional negligence rules can be justified
on the basis of pure economic efficiency,' 64 this structural analysis is at
least helpful in focusing attention upon those aspects of an SEC-attorney
conflict under rule 2(e) viewed as critical by both the Commission and the
lawyer. Likewise, use of a balancing procedure is commensurate with the
equitable considerations inherent in discussions of ethical conduct, al-
lowing the administrative law judge discretion to weigh various factual
considerations more heavily than other considerations. Not only is the
cost-benefit analysis more flexible than the Carter standard, but its long
history (in a relative sense) makes application of the analysis more certain.
One might argue that the explicit negligence standard endorsed herein
offers no more predictability or certainty to the practicing attorney faced
with a difficult ethical decision surrounding disclosure than does the
Carter decision. That argument ignores, however, the fact that most attor-
neys have a working familiarity with negligence-based standards while be-
ing largely uninformed about local ethical promulgations. 165 Familiarity
with the interpretations and application of the negligence standard should
lead to more certain attorney predictions of ethical judgments.166 Second,
use of the traditional negligence standard avoids the necessity of defining
what constitutes "prompt steps" to end client nondisclosure. While the
concept of reasonability has not yet been reduced to a physical science, it
nevertheless offers more precedential guidelines than does the new and po-
tentially more far-reaching notion of "prompt steps."'
167
Third, for the SEC to adhere to a simple standard of reasonable conduct
that all can understand would be better than to incorporate into rule 2(e)
proceedings the inherent dual standard of conduct in Carter. In fact, it
would almost be preferable for the Commission not to promulgate guide-
lines concerning ethical conduct if those guidelines are incomprehensible
or impractical. Doing so only lures the attorney into a false sense of confi-
dence and detracts from the SEC goal of properly controlling professional
conduct. Fourth, a negligence standard is preferable to the Carter decision
because of the very history of the former gauge of conduct. While not
concrete in the abstract, torts scholars have never really advocated refor-
162. Id at 32-34.
163. Id
164. See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
165. Kettlewell, Keep the Format of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 67 A.B.A.J.
1628, 1629 (1981).
166. Id
167. The term "prompt steps" also focuses upon temporal considerations of how fast the
attorney acts. Reasonability as a concept, however, centers upon the substantive rationality
of the attorney's conduct, including the subissue of promptness. Reasonability, therefore, is
a more flexible and rational standard of conduct measurement.
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mation of the negligence standard to a more specific, less flexible measure
of conduct. In mandating to certain groups what conduct is expected of
them, particularly in the area of professional ethics, rules and regulations
can only be so specific. But at the very least, the standard relied upon
should be one that is easily understood and one that has withstood the test
of long-term successful use. The negligence standard meets these require-
ments; the Carter standard does not.
If the SEC bar nevertheless feels that the securities lawyer would be
placed in an unfair position by this proposed negligence standard, despite
application of a favorable presumptive evidentiary burden and the use of a
cost-benefit analysis, other devices could be used to alleviate these appre-
hensions. For example, discovery on behalf of the Commission could be
limited in either time or scope. Likewise, the burden of proof incumbent
upon the SEC to prove rule 2(e) violations could be increased from a pre-
ponderance of evidence to clear and convincing evidence. 68 While use of
these additional roadblocks to rule 2(e) liability is currently premature and
should only be instituted in an effort to circumvent possible abuses of the
negligence-based standard, their institution would likely not be required.
The flexible nature and encompassing scope of tort-based liability should
prove to be the most practical solution.
SEC bar liability based upon this more demanding standard of negli-
gence assumes that the securities lawyer should be held to a higher ethical
standard of care than his peers. This higher standard is proper, for the
securities practitioner is not an advocate in the normal sense of the term. 1
69
The Commission has asserted that "[v]ery little of a securities lawyer's
work is adversary in character."'' 70
He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adversa-
ries and alert judges check him. He works in his office where he
prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and
other documents that we, our staff, the financial community, and the
investing public must take on faith. . . . Hence we are under a duty
to hold our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional
honor. 17
Indeed, to argue that the securities attorney is an advocate in the same
168. Cf. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981), in which the Supreme Court ruled that
the preponderance of the evidence standard as opposed to the clear and convincing standard
is the proper standard of proof in administrative cases comparable to Carter. The Court's
opinion can be read to allow a clear and convincing standard, however; the preponderance
standard is merely the minimum burden necessary for a finding of rule 2(e) violation. Com-
pare Note, The Burden of Proof in SEC Disciplinary Proceedings.- Preponderance and Be-
yond, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 516 (1981), advocating that the Court, not the SEC, should raise
SEC disciplinary hearing burdens of proof to the clear and convincing level. In light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Steadman, however, the SEC cannot be forced to raise
the preponderance standard to clear and convincing. Whether the Commission will choose
to do so of its own accord remains to be seen.
169. In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5405, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 79,407.
170. Id at 79,407 n.20.
171. Id
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sense as the trial lawyer is to overlook the peculiarly intimate relationship
the securities lawyer has with his client as well as the lack of a zealous
opponent in securities practice. While some have argued that an advocacy
relationship does exist in the securities area, 72 even those favoring this
perspective admit that this view is more hope than reality. 173 In the final
analysis, the SEC's position that the securities attorney must be held to a
more rigorous standard than his legal peers pivots upon the nonadversarial
scope of securities work. Thus the duty to uphold the ethics of practice
falls not only upon the shoulders of the Commission, to be effected by
discipline, but equally upon the shoulders of the bar, to be implemented
with the utmost of care and an acceptance of professional responsibility. 74
SEC disciplinary authority is merely the means by which the Commission
oversees the continuation of vigorous self-regulation by the securities bar.
The ultimate question then focuses upon what the attorney is to do when
he has given his client legal disclosure advice, and the client has failed to
follow that advice. Under a negligence-based standard of conduct, the at-
torney must act reasonably, and reasonability must focus upon the specific
factual context of the noncompliance with disclosure. Consequently, vir-
tually any attorney response to client noncompliance could under proper
conditions be determined reasonable, 175 even if initial advice is not imme-
diately accepted. Few would argue that it is reasonable for the attorney to
immediately resign or disclose noncompliance to a third party upon the
first violation of disclosure advice except in the most extreme circum-
stances. Still, a time comes when the reasonable lawyer must conclude
that his advice is not being sought or followed in good faith.' 76 At that
time, the securities attorney has three alternatives. A direct approach to
the board of directors or other controlling management is one possibil-
ity.' 77 Such an action might indicate persistence of the attorney in at-
tempting personally to rectify disclosure violations, but a question then
arises whether that conduct violates the attorney-client privilege. An obvi-
ously necessary inquiry is who constitutes the corporate client. If the con-
sulted board of directors or controlling management is adjudged to be the
client, then disclosing communications would not violate the privilege. 78
Conversely, assuming the client to be the corporate entity, approach to
certain management members might violate the privilege.
Another option for the attorney whose client fails to follow disclosure
172. See Smith, Disclosure Problems of Companies and the Responsibilities of Counsel, I
SEc. REG. L.J. 34 (1973).
173. "Some counsel have actually described the preparation of a registration statement
as involving an adversary relationship between themselves and the issuer, even if they repre-
sent the issuer. This is a healthy attitude which should be encouraged." Sonde, supra note
22, at 14 (emphasis added).
174. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
175. Carter, supra note 2, at N-19.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Calling disclosure noncompliance to the attention of controlling management, even
to board members who are outside directors, is often encouraged in this regard. See, e.g.,
Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549, 1556 (1978).
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advice is resignation.' 79 In most circumstances this alternative will not be
reasonable until the previous two alternatives are exhausted, for resigna-
tion encompasses considerations of client protection against foreseeable
prejudice. 180 Based upon the premise that "[t]he lawyer's continued inter-
action with his client will ordinarily hold the greatest promise of corrective
action,"' 18 the Carter opinion discourages resignation. While continuing
the attorney-client privilege may prove to be helpful, resignation may at
times constitute a reasonable course of action and should be encouraged if
disclosure advice concerning important matters is not followed. Such an
option by itself potentially encourages disclosure. 182
Finally, a reasonable alternative to be considered is whether the attor-
ney should approach an outside organization, usually the SEC, about his
client's failure to comply. While the Carter decision skirts this issue as not
applicable to that particular factual context, 183 this final option cannot be
ignored. The question arises as to whether the alternative of whistle-blow-
ing is reasonable under a tort-based standard of liability. As a policy mat-
ter, requiring the attorney to inform authorities of client noncompliance
would not only violate the attorney-client privilege, but it would likewise
discourage corporate willingness to seek legal advice concerning complex
compliance issues.184 Moreover, requiring the attorney to inform outside
authorities would place the attorney in an adversary relationship with his
own client. This alternative of turning in one's client should be adjudged
unreasonable per se and not required under any factual circumstance.
Thus, the attorney's most drastic alternative action to client noncompli-
ance should be resignation.1 85 To require otherwise would be to open a
Pandora's box of attorney-client privilege violations and encourage fears
of SEC abuse. 186 To require less responsibility on the part of the securities
attorney, conversely, serves merely to encourage an abdication of responsi-
bility on the part of the advising securities attorney, the result of which can
only be the decline and demise of an already fragile and abused system of
public protection. 187
179. Carter, supra note 2, at N-19.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Some have argued that threat of resignation is the most potent disclosure enforce-
ment tool available. Directors rarely contradict sound legal advice, especially if the attorney
is courageous enough to contemplate resignation. Cutler, supra note 178, at 1557.
183. Carter, supra note 2, at N-19 n.78.
184. Cutler, supra note 178, at 1557.
185. Id
186. Carter, supra note 2, at N-19.
187. The argument can be made that regardless of the disagreement concerning whether
securities lawyers should be treated differently from other advocates, any ethical regulation
of attorneys can most efficiently be carried on at the state or local level. This argument
ignores, however, a critical and functional benefit derived from SEC regulation of the secur-
ities attorney: uniformity of application. Consistent application of ethical rules of conduct
to a uniform set of federal securities laws serves to lighten the burden of compliance on the
attorney, for it obviates problems of ignorance of the law due to jurisdictional changes.
Additionally, present state bar systems of self-discipline in securities matters are inade-
quate. As most lawyers who participate in the local disciplinary structure are unfamiliar
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V. CONCLUSION
The SEC promulgated rule 2(e) pursuant to its general rulemaking pow-
ers in order to regulate the ethical conduct of the securities bar. While
Congress never expressly granted this regulatory power to the Commis-
sion, judicial precedent has established the validity of SEC authority in
this regard. Commission history has displayed the SEC's intent to exercise
this power to its full degree. While the recent Carter decision is a valid
attempt to define the broad range of Commission power to regulate the
ethics of the SEC bar, that decision fails to articulate adequately future
guidelines that attorneys in the securities arena can rely upon to insure that
their own conduct is within prescribed bounds. Focusing upon the inher-
ently nonadversarial nature of securities work, the SEC should instead
adopt a negligence-based reasonability standard, with additional clarifica-
tion as to proper burdens of production and proof, to define unethical and
unprofessional conduct within the structure of rule 2(e). This standard
would be more easily applied than the Carter decision, and tort law could
be compared analogously to the standard if difficulties of application arise.
Under a negligence standard of ethical conduct, the securities attorney
whose client fails to comply with disclosure advise would, depending upon
factual circumstances, have three alternatives to establish reasonability of
conduct: (1) further encourage the client to comply; (2) obtain assistance
in achieving compliance from control management; and (3) resign. As a
policy matter, informing authorities of compliance violations should no
be encouraged; it should be seen as unreasonable per se. Only through
clarification of stricter ethical standards can the powers that be ensure to
the public that securities attorney conduct is being adequately monitored.
Those standards must be uniformly applied, however, so that the fears of
the flock are calmed and the quality of securities practice is properly
maintained.
with the problems and concerns of the SEC, much less the intricacies of the federal securities
laws, it is not unusual for attorneys who have engaged in unethical securities activities to
escape the wrath of local bar discipline. See Cooney, The Registration Process. The Role of
the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329 (1978).
[Vol. 36
